| Eradication of Corruption | | | | corruption. Civil servants by and large value secrecy |
| Eradication of corruption should be the | | | | and are totally unwilling to share information about |
| nation’s number-one priority in view of the | | | | decisions with citizens. Openness and transparency |
| ever-increasing horizon of political and administrative | | | | are alien concepts in public bureaucracy in Bangladesh |
| corruption and its baneful multifarious effects on the | | | | (Khan, 1997). A number of actions have been |
| society-at-large. It needs to be understood by all that | | | | recommended to ensure transparency and thereby |
| eradication of corruption is only possible if strong | | | | considerably empower citizens and consequently |
| political commitment exists. Without strong political | | | | contain corruption (World Bank, 1996a:xii). First, the |
| commitment, bureaucratic reorientation and a vibrant | | | | Official Secrets Act of 1923 and Government Service |
| and effective civil society, checking corruption turns into | | | | Conduct Rules of 1979 should be suitably modified. |
| a very difficult almost impossible task. In the context of | | | | Second, a task-force on public-sector transparency |
| Bangladesh only radical and fundamental policy | | | | should be estabilished with membership from different |
| measures initiated and strongly backed by a | | | | professional and occupational groups to suggest |
| committed political leadership and supported and | | | | measures to enhance transparency. Third, necessary |
| implemented by a reoriented bureaucracy and | | | | steps should be taken to make all contract evaluation |
| watched and monitored by an organized and vocal | | | | reports public, thereby enabling all bidders to see how |
| civil society can control corruption. | | | | evaluations are made. Still other steps should be taken |
| Given the presence of three crucial variables - | | | | to ensure transparency and reduce corruption (Khan, |
| committed political leadership, reoriented bureaucracy | | | | 1997). Fourth, earning and tax payments of all public |
| and an organized and vocal civil society - other policy | | | | officials - elected as well as appointed - should be |
| measures need to be adopted to effectively contain | | | | published each year to enable the people to learn |
| as well as control corruption. What is proposed below | | | | about the assets of public officials. Fifth, interested |
| are a number of long-term and short-term policy | | | | citizens must be allowed access to relevant files and |
| measures placed in wider socio-political and economic | | | | documents. For this to happen the number of files |
| contexts to control corruption. | | | | marked secret and top secret should be drastically |
| The public sector employs over a million | | | | reduced. Sixth, civil servants long accustomed to |
| people in 35 ministries, 50 divisions, 221 departments, | | | | transact public business under the veil of secrecy |
| 139 directorates and autonomous bodies and 153 state | | | | should be appropriately trained and indoctrinated to |
| enterprises (World Bank 1996b:57). It may also be | | | | bring about necessary changes in their attitudes and |
| added that since independence the number of | | | | work habits. |
| ministries, departments and public servants has | | | | A number of specific policy measures have |
| doubled (Khan, 1997). In the context of present reality | | | | been recommended to control corruption in politics and |
| there is little rationale for maintaining a huge | | | | administration (World Bank, 1996a:xii; Rahman, et |
| public-sector edifice which contributes to corruption in | | | | al.,1993:97 and Khan, 1997). First, a high-powered task |
| public dealings. There is now justification for right-sizing | | | | force to be established consisting of public officials, |
| the government. Right-sizing of government will, among | | | | parliamentarians and leading citizens to review all |
| other things, will discourage creation and maintenance | | | | relevant issues pertaining to corruption and to suggest |
| of redundant agencies and units and restrain doling out | | | | a comprehensive eradication programme. Second, an |
| of public-service jobs as political favours. | | | | autonomous standing committee to be formed with |
| Public-sector accountability is weak, fuzzy and | | | | judges, senior public officials and leading citizens to |
| tenuous at best. This has resulted in the inability to | | | | oversee the activities of the Bureau of Anti-Corruption |
| enforce financial contracts, stop theft in public | | | | (BAC) as well as authorize investigation in ministries, |
| enterprises and hold officials accountable for improper | | | | corporations and other agencies by a statutory |
| or delayed judgment (World Bank, 1996a:viii). A number | | | | appointed and protected public prosecutor. Third, salary |
| of actions need to taken simultaneously to | | | | and benefits of civil servants need to be at par with |
| institutionalize and strengthen accountability to | | | | their counterparts in the private sector. Fourth, provision |
| effectively counter corruption. First, a bi-partisan | | | | of severe punishment including long stays in jails and |
| parliamentary task force be established to bolster the | | | | confisation of assets and properties to be instituted for |
| standing committees, instituting the practice of | | | | civil servants involved in corruption. Other measures |
| questioning ministers and providing members of | | | | have also been suggested to counter political and |
| parliament with adequate office and research facilities | | | | administrative corruption (Paul, 1997:288-304). Fifth, a |
| and setting up of an office of Ombudsman (World | | | | code of conduct should be adopted by the parliament |
| Bank, 1996a:viii). A parliamentary secretariat should be | | | | to provide guidelines for the conduct of elected |
| established outside the sphere of civil service and | | | | representatives and to take appropriate steps when |
| manned by competent personnel recruited separately | | | | departures from accepted norms are detected. Sixth, |
| and controlled by the speaker of the parliament (Khan, | | | | elected representatives must be compensated suitably |
| 1997). Second, the office of the Comptroller and | | | | to enable them to devote their attention only to public |
| Auditor General (CAG) must be reorganized and | | | | welfare and service. Seventh, enactment of a law to |
| strengthened by enhancing the capacity of the CAG | | | | regulate the functioning of political parties is needed. |
| (World Bank, 1996a:ix). Third, the standards of | | | | This law would require political parties to hold regular |
| performance of ministries/divisions and their attached | | | | organizational elections at different levels; maintain |
| agencies should be made known to the citizens | | | | prompt and systematic accounts and submit audited |
| (Rahman, et al., 1993:52). Fourth, complaint procedures | | | | accounts to either the Election Commission or the |
| should be in place in government agencies for wider | | | | Comptroller and Auditor General; and comply with |
| use of citizens (Khan, 1997). Fifth, monitoring | | | | income tax regulations and guidelines. Eighth, election |
| procedures need to be tightened so that the | | | | expenditure needs to be reduced and closely |
| concerned civil servant knows the extent of | | | | monitored by a designated body. Ninth, deregulation |
| compliance by his subordinates to relevant orders and | | | | and debureaucratisation, bounded discretion in decision |
| directives as well as services provided to citizens. | | | | making, realignment of the government’s audit and |
| Sixth, units be established in each ministry and division | | | | intelligence are to be encouraged to control corruption. |
| to develop and apply performance criteria and | | | | Tenth, existence of free media so that they can |
| measures and to develop internal performance audit | | | | investigate and expose corrupt practices. Eleventh, |
| (UNDP, 1993:106). | | | | voluntary agencies and religious groups as well as |
| Transparency in public-sector decision making | | | | other components of civil society can play significant |
| is totally absent. This absence, in turn, contributes to | | | | role in constraining corruption in public delaine. |